U.S. Policy Toward Political
Islam
Stephen Zunes
Foreign Policy in Focus
June 2001
The perceived growth of radical Islamic
movements throughout the Middle East and beyond has not only caused major
political upheaval in the countries directly affected but has placed
political Islam at the forefront of concerns voiced by U.S. policymakers.
One unfortunate aspect of this newfound attention has been the way it has
strengthened ugly stereotypes of Muslims already prevalent in the West.
This occurs despite the existence of moderate Islamic segments and secular
movements that are at least as influential as radicals in the political
life of Islamic countries.
Even though the vast majority of the
world's Muslims oppose terrorism, religious intolerance, and the
oppression of women, these remain the most prevalent images of the Muslim
faith throughout the Western world. Such popular misconceptions about
Islam and Islamic movements—often exacerbated by the media, popular
culture, and government officials—have made it particularly difficult to
challenge U.S. policy.
To be able to respond effectively to
Islamic militancy, the U.S. must clearly understand the reasons why a
small but dangerous minority of Muslims have embraced extremist ideologies
and violent tactics. These movements are often rooted in legitimate
grievances voiced by underrepresented and oppressed segments of the
population, particularly the poor. And the U.S. is increasingly identified
with the political, social, and economic forces that are responsible for
their misery. Many Muslims in the Middle East and elsewhere are exposed
not to the positive aspects of U.S. society -- such as individual liberty,
the rule of law, and economic prosperity -- but to the worst traits of
American culture, including materialism, militarism, and racism.
Although scientific and other advances from
the Muslim world helped Europe emerge from the Dark Ages, the West has
generally viewed Islamic peoples with hostility. From the time of the
Crusades through the European colonial era to the ongoing bombing and
sanctions against Iraq, Western Christians have killed far more Muslims
than the reverse. Given this strong sense of history among Muslims,
Washington's use and threat of military force, its imposition of punitive
sanctions, and its support of oppressive governments result in a popular
reaction that often takes the form of religious extremism.
When a people have lost their identity --
whether it be due to foreign occupation, war-induced relocation, the
collapse of traditional economies, or other reasons -- there is a great
pull to embrace something that can provide the structure, worldview, and
purpose through which to rebuild their lives. The mosque is one of the few
constants in Muslim countries undergoing great social disruption. Islam is
a faith that offers a clear sense of social justice, a feeling of
empowerment, and an obligation by individuals to challenge those who cause
the injustice. Although there has been a decidedly reactionary orientation
to some Islamic movements, other currents within Islam have been clearly
progressive.
Washington has used the threat of Islamic
fundamentalism as a justification for keeping a high military, economic,
and political profile in the Middle East. Yet it has often supported
Muslim hard-liners when they were perceived to enhance U.S. interests, as
they did in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.
Often, extremist Islamic movements arise in
direct response to U.S. policies. The 1953 overthrow by the CIA of the
moderate constitutional government of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran, followed
by years of support for the brutal regime of the shah, led directly to the
rise of the Islamic revolution in that country. U.S. support for the
regime of Jafaar Nimeiry during most of his repressive 16-year rule of
Sudan led to the destruction of much of that country's civil society,
resulting in the 1989 coup by hard-line Islamist military officers who
overthrew that country's brief democratic experiment. During the 1970s and
1980s, the destruction of moderate Muslim-led factions in Lebanon by
U.S.-backed invasions and occupations from Syria and Israel—and later
military intervention by the U.S. itself—led to a vacuum filled by more
sectarian groups such as Hezbollah, even as most of the other militias
that once carved up the rest of the country were disarmed by a revived
central government and its Syrian backers.
The roots of Islamic radicalism stem from
economic inequality, military occupation, and authoritarianism. Given that
U.S. policy in the Middle East and elsewhere has often perpetuated such
injustices, responsibility for the rise of radical Islamic movements can
often be traced to the U.S. itself.
Problems with Current U.S. Policy
The U.S. has supported hardline Islamic
movements and governments, such as the Saudi Arabia regime, which have
encouraged extremist movements elsewhere. U.S. support for repressive
governments makes democratic and nonviolent options for the Islamic
opposition extremely difficult. Neoliberal economic development strategie
-- vigorously encouraged by the U.S. -- have resulted in widespread
economic dislocation, which has in turn encouraged the growth of radical
Islamic movements.
Ironically, the U.S. has at times been a
supporter of hardline Islamic movements and governments. For example,
Washington armed extremist Islamic groups in Afghanistan during the 1980s
during the popular uprising against that country's communist regime backed
by Soviet occupation forces. Some of the most notorious Islamic terrorists
today -- including many followers of Osama Bin Laden -- originally
received their training from the CIA during that period.
Despite horrific reports from Afghanistan
about the Taliban government's totalitarian theocracy, which has far
surpassed the brutality of the communist regime of the 1980s, the U.S.
voiced little opposition to the regime until it refused to extradite Bin
Laden for trial on terrorism charges.
Currently, the U.S. maintains close
strategic cooperation -- including massive arms transfers, training and
logistics, and a permanent military presence -- with Saudi Arabia, one of
the most extreme states in the Muslim world considering its strict
interpretation of Islamic codes, repression of women, and political
orientation. The Saudis have used their vast oil wealth to encourage
like-minded movements throughout the Islamic world. Some of the
Islamic-identified governments and movements the U.S. has found most
troubling—the Hamas of Palestine, the Taliban of Afghanistan, the FIS of
Algeria, and the military government of Sudan—all had backing from the
Saudis at some point in their development.
Perhaps the most serious problem with U.S.
policy has been Washington's support for repressive allied governments
that suppress even moderate Islamic opposition groups. This often leads to
a backlash against any U.S. presence by Islamists reacting to American
support of what they perceive as an illegitimate government. The U.S. has
rationalized its support for several regimes engaging in patterns of gross
and systematic human rights violations as a regrettable but necessary
means of suppressing an Islamic opposition that Washington fears would be
even worse if it came to power. In many respects, this policy closely
parallels the decades of support during the cold war of repressive
right-wing governments in the name of anticommunism. The result is
similar: the lack of open political expression encourages suppressed
sectors to ally with an underground—and often violent and
authoritarian—opposition movement.
In some cases -- such as in Tajikistan and
other former Soviet republics -- the U.S. has even allied with old-line
Communist Party bosses as a means of countering the growth of Islamic
movements. This occurs despite the fact that the Islamic movements in much
of Central Asia are actually quite progressive and moderate (in part
because of the strong Sufi influence) when compared with some of their
Middle Eastern and North African counterparts.
Another factor fueling radical Islamic
movements has been the perceived U.S. culpability in the deaths of Muslim
civilians. From Washington's initial failure to respond to the Serbian
slaughter of Bosnian Muslims to the sanctions against Iraq to the support
of Israeli repression against Palestinian and Lebanese civilians, U.S.
foreign policy has laid itself open to this accusation.
Extremist Islamic political forces have
also arisen in areas where there has been large-scale dislocation due to
war. U.S. support for Israel's ongoing occupation and repression in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip has contributed to the rise of Hamas and other
radical Islamic movements, despite the fact that Palestinians historically
had been more pluralistic and tolerant than many of their Arab neighbors.
Islamic extremists were never much of a factor in Lebanese politics until
after the U.S.-backed 1982 Israeli invasion and Israel's 22-year
occupation of southern Lebanon.
Social dislocation can also result from
uneven economic development, as has been encouraged by the U.S. insistence
on globalization according to a neoliberal economic model. Largely
unregulated Western economic penetration in Egypt, Tunisia, the
Philippines, and elsewhere has exacerbated gross wealth inequalities and
triggered disruptive internal migration, giving rise to these countries'
Islamic extremists.
It would certainly be simplistic to blame
the U.S. exclusively for the rise of violent and extremist Islamic
political movements. Autocratic and misguided socialist policies in
Algeria -- which has had very little U.S. influence -- also resulted in an
Islamic reaction similar to movements triggered by autocratic and
misguided capitalist policies elsewhere. And in other countries, the
colonial legacies of the French and British along with certain domestic
factors have spawned extremist Islamic groups. Yet U.S. policies have
unquestionably fueled the development of this dangerous political trend.
Military solutions -- apparently preferred
by the U.S. and many of its allies -- will not succeed in countering the
rise of militant Islamic movements. Nevertheless, Washington has
successfully encouraged the NATO alliance, in a desperate attempt to
justify its existence at the end of the cold war, to place challenging
Islamic movements among its top strategic priorities. NATO has already
begun a dialogue with some North African regimes regarding mutual security
arrangements against a perceived Islamic threat.
Over the past two decades, the U.S. has
bombed Lebanon, Iran, Sudan, and Afghanistan in an effort to challenge
Islamic movements and governments viewed as antithetical to U.S.
interests. Such air strikes have not only been contrary to international
law but have also resulted in fueling anti-American hatred, particularly
when they have caused civilian casualties.
Trying to impose military solutions to what
are essentially political, economic, and social problems is doomed to
fail.
Toward a New Foreign Policy
The U.S. must shift from supporting
repressive governments to encouraging greater democracy and pluralism in
the Islamic world. The U.S. must demand an end to Israel's illegal
occupation of Arab East Jerusalem and other Palestinian territories and
promote a peace agreement that recognizes the city's importance to all
three monotheistic faiths. The U.S. should support sustainable economic
development in the Islamic world, so that the benefits of foreign
investment and globalization can be more fairly distributed with minimal
social disruption.
To effectively challenge the threat from
radical Islamic movements, the U.S. must shift its focus from trying to
crush such movements to pursuing policies that discourage their emergence.
Similarly, the U.S. must recognize that not all Islamic movements are
contrary to the development of political pluralism or good relations with
the United States.
From Afghanistan to Algeria and beyond,
radical Islamic movements have grown to prominence where there has been
great social dislocation in the population, whether it be from war or
misguided economic policies. Policies designed to minimize such traumatic
events will be far more successful than military threats in encouraging
moderation in Islamic countries.
The U.S. must cease its support for
autocratic regimes and encourage greater political pluralism. In countries
like Jordan, Turkey, and Yemen, where Islamic parties have been allowed to
compete in a relatively open political process, they have generally played
a responsible -- if somewhat conservative -- role in the political system.
The more radical elements observable in many Islamic movements are usually
a reflection of the denial of their right to participate in political
discourse. Many radical Islamic movements, such as those in Egypt,
Palestine, and Algeria, include diverse elements. Were they no longer
under siege and instead allowed to function in an open democratic system
they would likely divide into competing political parties ranging across
the ideological spectrum.
It is noteworthy that the FIS in Algeria
competed fairly and nonviolently during that country's brief political
opening in the early 1990s, only to have its anticipated election victory
stolen in a military coup. In the aftermath, the radical GAM emerged to
launch its campaign of terror against foreigners and broad segments of
Algerian society.
Indeed, no extremist Islamic movements have
ever evolved in democratic societies. Supporting democracy would therefore
be a major step in the direction of moderating political Islam. The U.S.
must stop considering Islam to be the enemy and instead encourage Islamic
movements by working for justice and economic equality.
Washington must support the Palestinians'
right to statehood in the West Bank and Gaza, including a shared Jerusalem
that would serve as the capital of both Israel and Palestine. Both
Congress and the executive branch should rescind resolutions and past
statements that imply support for Israel's unilateral annexation of Arab
East Jerusalem and surrounding Palestinian lands. Washington must instead
recognize the city's importance to all three monotheistic faiths. Not only
would such a policy shift bring the U.S. in line with international law,
UN Security Council resolutions, and virtually the entire international
community, but it would also remove a highly emotional and volatile issue
from the arsenal of Islamic extremists, who exploit the widespread anger
about U.S. support for the illegal Israeli occupation of a city that
Muslims also see as holy.
The U.S. should stop pushing for radical
economic liberalization in Islamic countries, since such policies increase
inequality and result in rising materialism and conspicuous consumption
for elites at the expense of basic needs of the poor majority. Instead,
the U.S. must support sustainable economic development, so that the
benefits of foreign investment and globalization can be more fairly
distributed with minimal social disruption. Although some Islamic
traditions have proven to be relatively tolerant of autocratic governance,
the presence of corruption and a lack of concern about social injustice by
a country's leadership are generally seen by Muslims as a violation of a
social contract and must be resisted.
In many respects, political Islam has
filled a vacuum that resulted from the failure of Arab nationalism,
Marxism, and other ideologies to free Islamic countries both from unjust
political, social, and economic systems and from Western imperialism. Just
because radical Islamic movements have embraced tactics and ideologies
reprehensible to most Westerners does not mean that the concerns giving
rise to such movements are without merit.
Only by addressing the legitimate
grievances of these movements will there be any hope of stopping their
often illegitimate methods and questionable ideologies. Otherwise, the
U.S. may find itself dealing with a series of conflicts that could eclipse
the bloody surrogate cold war battles that ravaged the third world in
previous decades.
Stephen Zunes is an associate professor of
politics and chairperson of the Peace & Justice Studies Program at the
University of San Francisco. Zunes is also a senior analyst and the Middle
East and North Africa editor at Foreign Policy In Focus.
This article was originally published
in the June 2001 issue of Foreign Policy in Focus.
Sources for More Information
Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori,
Muslim Politics (Princeton University Press, 1996).
John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat:
Myth or Reality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
John L. Esposito and John O. Voll,
Islam and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics
in the Middle East (New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1995).
Scott W. Hibbard and David Little, Islamic Activism and U.S. Foreign
Policy (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997).
Charles Hirschkind, "What Is Political Islam?" Middle East
Report, October-December 1997.
Stephen Hubbell, "The Containment Myth: U.S. Middle East Policy in
Theory and Practice," Middle East Report, Fall 1998.
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