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| Getting Used To The Idea Of
Double Standards Tariq Ali 15 September 2001 On a trip to Pakistan a few years ago I was talking to an ex-General about the militant Islamist groups in the region. I asked him why these people, who had happily accepted funds and weapons from the United States throughout the Cold War, had become violently anti-American overnight. He explained that they were not alone. Many Pakistan officers who had served the US loyally from 1951 onwards felt humiliated by Washington's indifference. 'Pakistan was the condom the Americans needed to enter Afghanistan', he said. 'We've served our purpose and they think we can be just flushed down the toilet.' The old condom is being fished out for use
once again, but will it work? The new 'coalition against terrorism' needs
the services of the Pakistan Army, but General Musharraf will have to be
extremely cautious. An over-commitment to Washington could lead to a civil
war in Pakistan and split the Armed Forces. A great deal has changed over
the last two decades, but the ironies of history continue to multiply. In Pakistan itself,
Islamism derived its strength from state patronage rather than popular
support. The ascendancy of religious fundamentalism is the legacy of a
previous military dictator, General Zia-ul-Haq who received solid backing
from Washington and London throughout his 11 years as dictator. It was during his rule
(1977-89) that a network of madrassahs (religious boarding schools),
funded by the Saudi regime, were created. The children, who were later sent to fight
as Mujahedeen in Afghanistan, were taught to banish all doubt. The only
truth was divine truth. Anyone who rebelled against the imam rebelled
against Allah. The madrassahs had only one aim: the production of
deracinated fanatics in the name of a bleak Islamic cosmopolitanism. The
primers taught that the Urdu letter jeem stood for 'jihad'; tay for 'tope'(cannon),
kaaf for Kalashnikov and khay for khoon (blood). 2500 madrassahs produced a crop of 225,000
fanatics ready to kill and die for their faith when asked to do so by
their religious leaders. Despatched
across the border by the Pakistan Army, they were hurled into battle
against other Muslims they were told were not true Muslims. The Taliban
creed is an ultra-sectarian strain, inspired by the Wahhabi sect that
rules Saudi Arabia. The severity of the Afghan mullahs has been denounced
by Sunni clerics at al-Azhar in Cairo and Shi-ite theologians in Qom as a
disgrace to the Prophet. The Taliban could not, however, have
captured Kabul on their own via an excess of religious zeal. They were
armed and commanded by 'volunteers' from the Pakistan Army. If Islamabad
decided to pull the plug, the Taliban could be dislodged, but not without
serious problems. The victory in Kabul counts as the Pakistani Army's only
triumph. To this day, the former US Secretary of
State, Zbigniew Brezinski remains recalcitrant: 'What was more important
in the world view of history?' he asks with more than a touch of
irritation, 'the Taliban or the fall of the Soviet Empire? A few
stirred-up Muslims or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the
Cold War?' If Hollywood rules necessitate a short,
sharp war against the new enemy, the American Caesar would be best-advised
not to insist on Pakistani legions. The consequences could be dire: a
brutal and vicious civil war creating more bitterness and encouraging more
acts of individual terrorism. Islamabad will do everything to prevent a
military expedition to Afghanistan. For one thing there are Pakistani
soldiers, pilots and officers present in Kabul, Bagram and other bases.
What will be their orders this time and will they obey them? Much more
likely is that Ossama Bin Laden will be sacrificed in the interests of the
greater cause and his body dead or alive will be handed over to his former
employers in Washington. But will that be enough? The only real
solution is a political one. It requires removing the causes that create
the discontent. It is despair that feeds fanaticism and it is a
result of Washington's policies in the Middle East and elsewhere. The
orthodox casuistry among loyal factotums, columnists and courtiers of the
Washington regime is symbolised by Tony Blair's
Personal Assistant for Foreign Affairs, ex-diplomat Robert Cooper, who
writes quite openly: 'We need to get used to the idea of double
standards'. The underlying maxim
of this cynicism is: we will punish the crimes of our enemies and reward
the crimes of our friends. Isn't that at least preferable to universal
impunity? To this the answer is simple: 'punishment' along these lines
does not reduce but breeds criminality, by those who wield it. The
Gulf and Balkan Wars were copy-book examples of the moral blank cheque of
a selective vigilantism. Israel can defy UN resolutions with impunity,
India can tyrannise Kashmir, Russia can destroy Groszny, but it is Iraq
which has to be punished and it is the Palestinians who continue to
suffer. Cooper continues: 'Advice to post-modern
states: accept that intervention in the pre-modern is going to be a fact
of life. Such interventions may not solve problems, but they may salve the
conscience. And they are not necessarily the worse for that' Try
explaining that to the survivors in New York and Washington. The United States is
whipping itself into a frenzy. Its ideologues talk of this as an attack on
'civilization', but what kind of civilization is it that thinks in terms
of blood-revenge. For the last sixty years and more the United States has
toppled democrat leaders, bombed countries in three continents, used
nuclear weapons against Japanese civilians, but never knew what it felt
like to have your own cities under attack. Now they know. To the victims of the attack and their relatives one can offer our deep sympathy as one does to people who the US government has victimised. But to accept that somehow an American life is worth more than that of a Rwandan, a Yugoslav, a Vietnamese, a Korean, a Japanese, a Palestinian...that is unacceptable.
A Political Solution is Required
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