A
Western Construct?
Faisal Kutty
Fifty-eight years after the universal declaration of human rights was
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, the debate continues as to
whether the document is truly universal.
Upon its adoption on Dec. 10, 1948, former
U.S.
First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt, chair of the commission on human rights,
expressed her hope it would become "the Magna Carta of all
mankind." Ironically, as was the fate with the "great
charter" of 1215, the declaration has not fully lived up to its name.
The declaration was challenged from its very
inception. The commission's first draft attracted 168 amendments from
various countries. However, the final document was almost unchanged from
the initial draft tabled by the commission. Forty-eight countries voted in
favour, while eight countries --
Poland
,
Byelorussia
,
Czechoslovakia
, the
Ukraine
,
Yugoslavia
,
South Africa
,
Saudi Arabia
and the
Soviet Union
-- abstained and expressed reservations.
The conflicting views on the declaration have
become more pronounced recently as human rights take a more central role
in international and domestic forums. The critics of the current
international human rights standards range from cultural relativists and
Islamists to proponents of Asian values. They contend the existing
international human rights regime is deeply influenced by the western
experience. The spotlight on the individual, the focus on rights divorced
from duties, the emphasis on legalism to secure these rights and the
greater priority given to civil and political rights are all hallmarks of
the western bias. In contrast, the Asian (including Buddhist, Taoist,
Confucian, Hindu, etc.) and Islamic conceptions would emphasize community,
duties to one another and society and some even place greater emphasis on
economic, social and cultural rights.
The philosophical and ideological underpinnings defining human
relationship with each other and society in many non-western societies are
at variance with our fixation with individualism or what some would call
radical individualism.
The focus on individual rights -- in some
cases to the detriment of the family and community -- is not consistent
with many non-western outlooks on human rights.
Confucian scholar Tu Weiming writes: "Confucian humanism offers an
account of the reasons for supporting basic human rights that does not
depend on a liberal conception of persons."
However, this in no way implies that such views are totally devoid of
consideration for the individual. The substructures of human rights in
some non-western conceptions attempt to establish equilibrium between
individualism and collectivism in ways that are different from ours. Far
from being a contradiction, as documented by collectivists theorists such
as Harry Triandis, individualism and collectivism can coexist and in fact
can thrive together.
From the Confucian perspective, for instance, Weiming notes: "Human
rights are inseparable from human responsibilities."
Although in the Confucian tradition, duty-consciousness is more
pronounced than rights-consciousness -- to the extent that the Confucian
tradition underscores self-cultivation, family cohesiveness, economic
well-being, social order, political justice and cultural flourishing -- it
is a valuable spring of wisdom for an understanding of human rights
broadly conceived."
The natural law origin of the declaration
also conflicts with the religious view that rights are derived from divine
authority.
Brazil
's suggestion the declaration ought to have referred to a transcendent
entity was rejected outright during the debate leading to the
declaration's adoption. One argument says the denial of divine authority
is essential to make the philosophy underlying rights protection
universal. How can something be universal when it rejects the view of a
significant component of the world's population -- not only eastern
religions but also adherents of Christianity and Judaism -- who believe in
some form of divine authority? Why should the assumption of secular elite
be imposed on everyone?
The extensive list of fundamental human
rights is subject to certain general limitations, set out in articles 29
and 30 of the declaration. Article 29 (2), for instance, provides for
"limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of
securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others
and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the
general welfare in a democratic society." The different philosophies
and views undoubtedly will produce equally valid interpretations of such
restrictive articles and human rights standards in general.
A strong argument can be made that the
current formulation of international human rights constitutes a cultural
structure in which western society finds itself easily at home. This has
led some western human-rights scholars to arrogantly conclude that most
non-western societies lack not only the practice of human rights but also
the very concept. This clearly overlooks the fact that we can only claim
to be better than others because we use our own values and standards to
measure them.
Dominance cannot be equated with the truth,
though it is easy to get caught up in the old confusion between might and
right.
It is important to acknowledge and appreciate
that other societies may have equally valid alternative conceptions of
human rights. Exiled Tunisian Islamist leader Rachid Ghannouchi once told
a reporter: "I think a universal concept of human rights must come
from the philosophical vision of all peoples."
The call for a more inclusive conception is
laudable, particularly given that even proponents of the other views
acknowledge that there are certain universal values.
For instance, the jailed former deputy prime minister of Malaysia,
Anwar Ibrahim, a proponent of both Asian values and Islam, writes in his
book, The Asian Renaissance, "To say that freedom is western .
. . is to offend our own traditions as well as our forefathers, who gave
their lives in the struggle against tyranny and injustice."
Claims of universality do not ensure universal acceptance.
Accommodating the various conceptions within the international
framework may or may not be plausible. The difficulty of the task should
not prevent us from grappling with this issue. At least from this exercise
we may in fact learn that there are indeed certain truly universal ideals
and principles shared by us all.
Indeed, the belief that the current
international human rights regime is derived exclusively from the
ideological framework of the west is a major obstacle in its acceptance as
a truly universal vision. As suggested by a number of human rights
scholars, the United Nations must initiate a project to rethink and
reformulate the conception of human rights, taking into account the
different philosophies that share this planet.
The only way to ensure universal acceptance
of and compliance with international human rights law is by removing the
crutch used for so long by human rights violators -- that human rights as
we know it today is a western construct.
About
the Author:
Faisal Kutty is a
Toronto
lawyer, writer and doctoral candidate at Osgoode Hall Law School of York
University. His articles are
archived at www.faisalkutty.com
and he can be reached at kutty@bakshkutty.com
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