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| The Muslim 'Marginal' Man Tanveer Ahmed Understanding the psychological and
sociological state of Western Muslims will help integrate society and
avoid terrorism. Terrorism has shone a light on Islam in the
West. With many perpetrators of terrorist acts Muslims raised or educated
in Western countries, their communities are under much greater scrutiny.
After decades of multiculturalism there is doubt again about whether
vastly different cultures and value systems can live side by side in
respectful tolerance. Understanding why some individuals turn to terrorism
and others do not is crucial to its prevention, and to the peaceful
integration of Muslims into Western society. Turning to terrorists The man who kidnapped Wall Street Journal
journalist Daniel Pearl was born in Britain. He studied at a posh English
public school and the London School of Economics—not known for its
‘madrasah’ qualities. His parents were Pakistani emigrants. Ahmed Omar
Sheikh said he wasn’t British, nor Pakistani, just a Muslim. He said he
could never be accepted by the ‘racist’ British. Though he never committed a terrorist act,
the closest Australian parallel could be seen in the trial of the medical
student Ihsan Al-Haque. He was accused of joining a banned terrorist
group. He later said he had no idea that the organisation he joined, one
committed to Kashmiri liberation, was banned and that he thought he was
going to some kind of a camp. It seems strange that a young, intelligent
man growing up in a Pakistani household in western Sydney, training as a
doctor, would have any interest in Pakistani insurgents trying to claim
Kashmir. While his apparent failure in his studies suggests frustration
may have been a factor, it hardly explains a sudden desire for martyrdom.
He even told his parents that he was ‘sick of Westerners’ before he
left for Pakistan. The Australian ‘Other’ A look at the sensitive issue of the gang
rapes in Sydney reveals how these tensions can reveal themselves in
criminal acts. Last year saw the appeal of Bilal Skaf, who led the group
of Lebanese youth involved in the gang rape of a Sydney teenager. Another
gang rape involved a group of Pakistani brothers. The details of the rape
and the sentences thereafter are not important for this discussion. While
such instances do not show that Muslims are somehow more likely to commit
rape, it is worth studying some similarities between the cases. The most significant link between the two
gang rapes was that the victim was perceived quite clearly as the
‘Other’, a racial and cultural inferior. One of the offenders amongst
the Lebanese group called their victim an ‘Aussie slut’. A
psychological study of one of the Pakistani brothers, identified as MSK,
suggests ‘socio-cultural factors and family dynamics’ played a
considerable role in their views about Australian women, a key factor in
the crime. In particular, the psychologist believed MSK felt Australian
women were immoral and wanted sex. MSK undertook an arranged marriage a few
years earlier with a woman from his native Pakistan. He was only 20 years
old at the time. The peculiar practice of arranged marriage is a rejection
of the culture and practices of the adopted homeland, in this case
Australia. While exact figures are difficult to find, it is particularly
common among migrants from the subcontinent but also occurs among those of
Arab and Asian backgrounds. It is an act of resistance to assimilation and
a perceived cultural dissolution. There is some element of a siege mentality.
I know from my own experience within the Bangladeshi community that many
new immigrants come believing they can build wealth and educate their
children whilst at the same time shielding themselves from any Australian
cultural influence, which they perceive as without morals. Arranged
marriage is one such way they can shield themselves. MSK had been brought
up in such a household, where the outside world of the West was perceived
as ‘the Other’. It would be no surprise if his sense of identity was a
little warped. ‘Marginal man’ The sociologist Everett Stonequist invented
the term ‘marginal man’ to explain the situation. While it sounds like
an incomplete superhero, it referred to people caught up in the tussle
between two distinctive cultural systems. His theory suggests that threats
to identity may lead to higher levels of deviance, excessive anxiety and
psychiatric instability. The ‘marginal man’ is the person who
straddles two cultures in society. The marginal person may be rejected,
and feel alienated, by one or both parents, by home or by school. Second-generation youth, particularly from
Asia or the Middle East, are often encouraged by their parents to distance
themselves from the dominant culture of the West, which the parents often
perceive as immoral and hedonistic. At the same time, adolescents who
return to their country of origin usually find they feel more alien there.
They are confronted with inadequacies in language competency, historical
knowledge and awareness of cultural and social assumptions of the
idealised place of origin. The British study concluded that this kind
of marginal, compartmentalised life is often difficult to maintain, for
the role-conflict can threaten a sense of ‘ego-identity’. In lay
terms, they cannot carry their inconsistent selves through to adulthood.
It cites some cases of second-generation youth undergoing what they called
a ‘fundamental change’ in their late teens or early 20s as some kind
of resolution. This often involves a dramatic shift to either side of the
cultural divide, perhaps committing to an arranged marriage or seeking
refuge in deep religiosity. Or it can occur in the opposite behaviour,
such as eloping with a partner against their parents’ wishes. Parental expectations Only last December British police announced
that the suicide rate for South Asian women in the UK aged 16-24 was three
times higher than the national average. The announcement coincided with
investigations into 122 British honour killings over the past decade, a
horrific manifestation of the fear of assimilation. There are no equivalent figures in
Australia, but I can speak of a case I have seen that fits into this
category. A young Egyptian woman presented to me suicidal last year after
she felt there was no way to keep her parents happy and still live an
independent life. It was precipitated after her father removed her from a
school dance, which she attended without his approval. She stayed at home
for the next three months, except for school. Her father had told her that
she had ‘dishonoured’ him. I also remember the 2003 suicide of a 21
year old Bangladeshi girl, Shohana Islam, whose body washed up on a
Melbourne beach. She was a university student whose parents had recently
visited Bangladesh in order to find her a husband. It emerged she was
waiting to meet an Australian boyfriend on the day of her death. He did
not come. In newspaper reports, it is interesting that while Miss Islam
remained missing, the father’s message to her was that ‘we are not
angry’, suggesting there was conflict regarding her choices in love.
Whilst Miss Islam did not turn to religion, her case illustrates some of
the difficulties in juggling disparate identities. More recently, the murderer of Dutch film
director Theo Van Gogh, Mohammed Bouyeri, is a classic example of a young
educated man turning to Islam after feeling disappointed about his home
country. Brought up in Holland and trained as a social worker, Bouyeri
turned to extremist groups after he was declined subsidies from the Dutch
government. This was further complicated by the sudden death of his
mother. An article in The New Yorker (10 January 2005) wrote of Bouyeri: Perhaps it was his mother’s death, or
perhaps it was the series of setbacks and disappointments he encountered;
in any event, Mohammed became unhinged…Once a model pupil, apparently
well adjusted to Dutch society, (he) became a holy warrior. It is within this context the concept of
‘identity Islam’ emerges. The simultaneous alienation from Western
cultural traditions and the culture of their parents can encourage the
embrace of what they perceive as a culture-free, global Islamic militancy. Identity Islam Part of political Islam’s prestige stems
from the fact it is often the only oppositional voice raised against
repressive regimes in the Islamic world. This is partly because the lack
of a free press or the right to protest means the mosque is often the only
place to discuss politics. But political Islam appears to take on a
new life in the West. The rejection of culture is central to this
movement. This is partly due to the fact that its participants often felt
alienated from any culture, native or adopted. An ideological premise of
internationalist identity Islam is that ‘true’ Islam is apparently
floating above everything cultural. It is pristine and unassailable. There
is a belief, contrary to any historical fact, that during the birth of
Islam in the sixth and seventh centuries, a utopian state had been
established where everyone was happy and honest. This state of affairs,
the thinking goes, should be re-imposed on humanity today. The internationalist Muslim revivalist
movements such as Jamaat Islami, referred to as Jemaah Islamiyah in South
East Asia, have encouraged this concept of a ‘cultureless’ Islam. The
revivalists often dominate Islamic gatherings due to their commitment,
pre-existing networks and defined ideological agenda. Muslim elders often
welcome such elements because it helps them to resist the immediate threat
of assimilation into Western culture, by keeping the youth ‘Muslim and
proud of it.’ The American sociologist Marcia Hermansen studied Muslim youth organisations in university campuses around the US. She wrote of the attraction of such an ideology: One can often imagine the problems of
Muslim youth, often isolated by having distinctive names, physical
appearance, and being associated with a stigmatized culture and religion.
No wonder the concept that they were actually the superior ones, fending
off the corrupt and evil society around them, rang pleasant. Nor do the practices have to be Western to
be rejected. I attended an Eid prayer to commemorate the end of Ramadan,
the month of fasting, and heard a cleric tell the largely South Asian
audience to never wear saris again. This was an ‘heretical
innovation’, he proclaimed. Identity Islam is sustained by a sense of
moral superiority and Muslim cheerleading. It is not an intellectual
critique of alternatives but rather a rejection of the ‘Other’, namely
the West. Instead it creates a de-cultured, rule-based space where one
asserts Muslim ‘difference’ based on gender segregation, romantic
recreations of the past and apologetic articulations of Islam. Despite
often having high quality education, its members become skilled at
interpreting away key verses in the Koran explicitly allowing things like
domestic violence or polygamy. Of course, Muslims are not the only people
skilled at creative interpretation. Allegiance to the tribe is all important.
Like any tribe, membership comes with its own rituals, symbols and
actions. It is nowhere rooted in historical fact, for wherever Islamic
civilisation took root around the world, it acculturated at the same time
it Islamicised. The idea of a ‘culture free’ Islam is therefore
derived from modern ideologies rather than from authentic practice. Terrorist tribes Very rarely. The vast majority of Muslim
youth fall somewhere between extreme interpretations of identity Islam and
a complete adoption of Western practices. Some flee from their Muslim
background, while others like Irshad Manji, author of The Trouble with
Islam: A Muslim’s Call for Reform In Her Faith, are progressive
activists. Most are moderate, struggling to balance their varying
allegiances. Furthermore, religious zeal tends to dissipate with age as
career and family demands take over. Marc Sageman, a forensic psychiatrist who
worked for the CIA, refers to the groups that may commit acts of terrorism
as ‘Bunches of Guys’. In his book Understanding Terror Networks he
concentrates on these loose tribes of young men who go one step further
and bind each other to secret membership and a mutual commitment to acts
of violence. In another setting, similar groups of men
might brawl at soccer matches or rob banks. In terror cells, the kinship
and friendship networks combine with images of violence against Muslims,
such as in Palestine, Kashmir, and more recently southern Thailand, to
encourage a deepening faith in the ideology of identity Islam. It is then
they are vulnerable to access by the better resourced members of what we
term Al-Qaeda. Sageman argues that poverty, religious
belief and frustration are ‘necessary but not sufficient’ to explain
how a few angry young Muslim men—but not many, many others—decide to
embrace jihadist violence. The social bonds of tribal membership, central
to asserting a strong identity, are more important. When these groups
unite with al-Qaeda leaders or trainers, the danger of terrorist violence
heightens. Sageman argues that Al-Qaeda is more reliant on such cells since it lost its Afghan sanctuary. He cites the Moroccans who carried out the Casablanca hotel bombings in 2002 as an example. They planned their attacks in local caves and forests. They were aided by advice from senior al-Qaeda trainers trained in Afghanistan. The Madrid bombings are another example. Sageman also offers policy advice on how to
stop terrorism. From his days working as a spy recruiter, he notes that
the tight group loyalty amongst Islamic radicals makes it very hard to
lure informers or agents. This is the major reason why Western
intelligence has been so poor regarding previous terrorist acts. But he
believes that the best luck is to be had from Bunches Of Guys who trained
for jihad but didn’t act. The Australian case of Al-Haque probably falls
into this category. The Al-Qaeda Sageman writes of is more
movement than organisation, an ‘imagined community’, in the phrase of
anthropologist Benedict Anderson. Its symbolism holds attraction for those
seeking a universal dimension to their self-image, and can easily fit with
the perceived purity of identity Islam. Avoiding alienation But the problem of identity Islam remains
and will continue to present difficulties. The French intellectual Tariq
Ramadan argues Muslims in the West need to find a ‘Third Way’ where
they combine the elements that Islam has in common with Western
philosophies. He believes European Muslims can have their cake and eat it
too, it seems, arguing that democracy is consistent with Islamic values.
He says it is most important to break down the ‘us versus them’
mentality within Islamic communities. Ramadan also believes Western leaders
should encourage greater understanding via promoting an ‘inclusive
memory’—recognising the commonalities and overlap between Muslim
philosophy and Western philosophy—so that Muslims ‘feel part of’ and
invested in ‘the present.’ His immense popularity in France and Europe
suggest there is huge demand for voices advocating such synthesis. Ramadan’s critics, however, suggest that
he advocates ambivalence and only exacerbates the confusion amongst
Muslims in the West. They contend that there are many situations where
loyalty to Islam conflicts with the values of their adopted homelands. If
their religion states they are to be Muslims first, where can this Third
Way of Ramadan be? Muslims experience doubt about Australian
society’s attitudes towards them, as well as about their own view of
Australian society. In my own experience, I think many Muslims’
sensitivities are currently heightened to any kind of criticism. It is not
unlike the radical Jews who see any criticism of Israel as tantamount to
anti-Semitism. A recent report from the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity
Commission showed Muslims, especially women, felt they had experienced
much greater racism in recent years in all aspects of their life. This
ranged from uncomfortable looks to violence. A real challenge is persuading young
Australian Muslims that there is meaning in being Australian as well as
Muslim. School counsellors can play a key role and their education on such
matters is paramount, noting the deep psychological conflict Muslim youth
may experience. Whilst research into their impact on multicultural
communities is limited, their potential in preventing the psychological
deterioration of children is well known. However, the needs of Islamic
communities are unique and it is unclear if current training methods for
school counselors are sufficient. In Britain, a number of social workers
speak of their isolation and an inability to grasp the complexities of
some of their South Asian clients. The outsider status of many Australian
health professionals suggest there is a strong role for Islamic
communities themselves to conduct their own programmes in identifying and
helping troubled children and adolescents. A mentor programme is a
possible example. Islamic schools will remain controversial.
The needs of minority groups do need to be addressed, but I suspect the
curricula of Islamic schools needs closer monitoring. This is especially
true with regards to the reluctance of Islamic schools to teach any kind
of sex or drug education and their attitude to evolution as just another
theory to sit alongside Koranic creation stories. Moderate imams also need to be encouraged,
for the vast majority of the current group tend toward the extreme. They
are often imported from the Middle East and have little interest or
knowledge in Australian affairs. One approach, currently being tested by
France, is to set up local training schools for imams. A greater public voice is all-important in
making minorities feel included. Moderate Islamic voices need to be
fostered and supported. One such way to do this could be to sponsor
academic speeches on university campuses. This will also encourage a
greater acceptance of diversity within Islamic communities. Like
Christians and Jews, there are many Muslims who do not live piously but
still see their Muslim background as important. These ‘cultural’
Muslims need to be legitimised as a middle ground between assimilationists
and rejectionists. Australian Islamic communities have
improved their public voice in the past few years, with a greater number
of community groups working for a more positive image of Islam and greater
voice for Muslims. Muslim commentators such as Amin Saikal and Waleed Aly
appear regularly in the media. But their presence in popular Australian
culture is still non-existent. Where are the Muslims in Neighbours? The growing difficulty of identity Islam
and its tribal, oppositional nature needs to be recognised and confronted.
Unless channelled into more constructive directions, the energies and
aspirations of Muslim youth, both in Australia and abroad, may be spent in
the pursuit and reinforcement of a brittle tribalism that will not
withstand the test of time. Furthermore, the dubious affiliations of this tribalism will continue to be the fuel for future acts of terrorism. Dr Tanveer Ahmed is a psychiatrist and
writer. He has worked as a television journalist for SBS TV and
contributes to the major Australian broadsheets. Source: http://www.cis.org.au/Policy/autumn05/polaut05-7.htm |